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Society and the Balance of
Professional Dominance and Patient
Autonomy in Medical Care
BERNICE A. PESCOSOLIDO"
Through "Bioethics with a Human Face" Carl Schneider crafts a lens to
view in sharp and clear focus the nature of the bioethics' debate, the central
linchpin of patient autonomy in these discussions, and the limits encountered
when intellectual debates confront empirical reality in the world of medical
decision-making.' As the end point to his arguments, Professor Schneider
asserts that social, institutions inevitably shape the nature of future medical
decisions; the fascination lies in exploring how particular social institutions
will influence their specific character.2 This ending point presents my starting
point, for it raises a paradox. How could the same set of social institutions,
or perhaps better said, the same socio-historical context, produce two
paradigms-biomedicine and bioethics-that so clearly oppose one another?
The simple answer is an historical one. The rise of American modem
medicine at the turn of the last century heralded a professionally dominant
class of medical practitioners never before seen and so set the stage for the
later appearance of the new discipline of bioethics which stands as a
counterpoint to this incredible power over health, illness, and healing.' The
more complex but more accurate and useful answer lies in taking a sociology
of knowledge approach to understanding the modem medical profession, the
bioethics discipline, the interaction of the individual and society, and the
general nature of intellectual debates. Both biomedicine and bioethics
developed as a response to social problems. The development marked,
reflected, and addressed inherent societal tensions, particularly regarding the
balance of expertise and individualism. Both were set within the larger
paradigm of modem society which shaped the range of possibilities for the
terms of a modem, science-based medicine and the discourse surrounding the
problems that bioethics addresses. Further, both reflect the rhetoric of
innovation through exaggeration, particularly in intellectual debates that
promote and accompany the development bf paradigms and the adoption of
social policy that follow from them.
I will pull the lens back even further than Professor Schneider does, back
beyond an overview of bioethical literature and its connection to modem
medicine and patient preference. I argue that biomedicine and bioethics
* Associate Professor of Sociology, Indiana University. I would like to thank Christine Wright-
Isak, Katherine McFate, and Norman Fumiss for stimulating discussions that pushed my thinking during
the writing of this paper.
I. Carl E. Schneider, Bioethics With a Human Face, 69 IND. L.J. 1075 (1994).
2. Id.
3. While much of this discussion draws from and is relevant to modem society cross-nationally,
I restrict my comments to the situation in the United States.
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represent socially constructed phenomena shaped by individuals engaged in
intellectual debate, actual practice, and political action, who confronted real
problems of life and death in the context of industrial society. In this light,
I extend Professor Schneider's striking synthesis of intellectual debate and
empirical reality in bioethics in three ways.
First, in light of characteristic tensions in modem society, a socio-historical
understanding of the rise of the modem medical profession and the bioethics'
discipline requires a link to both larger structures of power and cultural
values. This contextual view requires neither notions of conspiracy nor
functional imperatives; rather, it requires a more subtle and sophisticated view
of social change and social structures. Second, difficulties associated with the
centrality of the autonomy principle arise not only from specific findings
which show a clear disjuncture between what bioethicists argue people want
and what people in fact tell us they want, but also from the underlying view
of how individuals make decisions. This takes discussions of medical
decision-making into the current, lively debate in social science disciplines
about the utility of decision-making. Bioethics, implicitly if not explicitly,
views it as a rational calculus process. Finally, these considerations raise
questions regarding the utility of centralized autonomy in bioethics. These
questions arise not because centralized autonomy in bioethics fails to connect
significant portions of present reality, as Professor Schneider persuasively
documents, but because it represents a crucial mismatch of the problems and
issues that may loom on the threshold of the twenty-first century. In essence,
I argue that the quest for patient autonomy may be misguided, given what
social scientists, particularly sociologists, theorize and have begun to
document concerning contours of the new, transitional form of society we are
in, be it labeled post-modem, post-industrial, neo-modem, or otherwise. Each
of these arguments are dealt with in a separate section below.
I.
Professor Schneider convincingly argued that the dominant theme in modem
bioethics thinking is patient autonomy. The question is whether this is
something unique to the bioethics paradigm or whether it was a natural and
consistent, though not fated, occurrence given the socio-historical context
which called for a discussion and even a nascent discipline surrounding
medical ethics. Bioethics surfaced in response to the sheer power that the
modem medical profession gained through its virtual monopoly over the
healing arts. Practitioners of "regular" medicine (as the precursors to the
practitioners of "scientific," "Western," "modem," and "orthodox" medicine
were called) convinced those in powerful societal positions to make the
practice of a certain sort of medicine, "germ-theory" medicine, the profession
of medicine. While the terms of medical work-for example, the actual
organizational and financial arrangements for the practice of medicine-varied
from country to country, as Eliot Freidson argues, the keystone to professional
dominance lay in control over the content of medical work-for example,
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decisionmaking regarding the definitions of "disease," "medicine," "qualifica-
tions," and "monitoring"). 4 Autonomy and self-regulation were the key
principles in the societal contract that was enacted.
In this classic, now standard, understanding of the rise of modem medicine,
the public indeed played a role. To attain its preeminent position, the
profession did require state legitimation through licensing requirements, the
primary purview of elites. But it also had to achieve consulting status, that is,
lay acceptance of this type of medicine. In reality, the public's power was
limited to veto power. Like the politicians who crafted the legislation and the
industrialists who underwrote the building of scientific medical laboratories
and treatment facilities, the public was persuaded. This was no small feat
since many people, including much of the upper class, ascribed more to
homeopathic cures than the purgatives and bleeding practices that regular
physicians practiced early in twentieth century American medicine.'
Little need exists, however, to see this as a conspiracy of a profession
against the laity. Rather, the historical evidence suggests that the social
contract with the modem medical profession was a practical solution to new
problems in a new society. This does not negate that it was, as Larson
contends, a professional project of the new middle class; 6 rather it highlights
that the larger social context, specifically, industrialization and urbanization,
set the stage for the major players in new political and economic arrangements
concerning health, illness, and healing. The social construction of the
institution of medicine, described in ideo-typical form by Talcott Parsons,7
occurred within a societal context that emphasized a new scientific knowl-
edge, a culture of progress, and a larger societal theme of American
individualism. Others have argued more eloquently than I that this fit between
the ideologies underlying the germ theory and modem society allowed the
state to agree to a virtual-though in no country, total-monopoly.8 It also
allowed the state to reject more holistic and often more prevention-oriented
schools of medical thought like homeopathy, naturopathy, chiropractic
therapy, and even the more broadly focused modem medical approach of the
German social physicians such as Virchow. 9 The biomedical paradigm saw
"disease" in a very rational, mechanistic, decontextualized, and ultimately
conquerable fashion. In opposition to earlier and more diverse forms of
medical care, the original germ theory formulation focused on the disease in
4. ELIOT FREiDsON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED
KNOWLEDGE (1970).
5. There has been some debate over how the public's role actually played out historically since
most of the early, dramatic "victories" in modem medicine came well after the establishment of
professional dominance. See John B. McKinlay & Sonja M. McKinlay, Medical Measures and the
Decline of Mortality, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH AND ILLNESS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 10-30
(Peter Conrad & Rochelle Kern eds., 3d ed. 1990).
6. MAGALI S. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977).
7. TALCOTr PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1951).
8. See generally E. RICHARD BROwN, ROCKEFELLER MEDICINE MEN: MEDICINE AND CAPITALISM
IN AMERICA (1979).
9. Id.
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the body in the bed. ° This medicalized and micro view of disease allowed
both physicians and industrial capitalists to ignore larger features of this new
society that might produce injury, disease, and death (for example, the
precarious working conditions in early industrial enterprises) in favor of the
search for particular microbiological agents.
This bargain, however, was not struck without cost. As Talcott Parsons
contends in his original treatise," "we" agreed that physicians would serve
as the societal medical experts with a functionally specific, objectively
neutral, and scientifically based stance to treatment and to patients. In turn,
"we" agreed to be cooperative and compliant with the physician we freely
chose. Expertise demanded compliance and brought patient dependence after
the initial exercise of choosing a particular practitioner. As we handed over
our trust to the modern profession of medicine, so too we became less
knowledgeable about medicine and our values about life and death. The
contract, at its very base, established social inequality between expert and
layman and set up a basic paternalism.
If one takes Kai Erikson's view that culture is characterized by key "axes
of variation" which represent the countervailing and essential contrasts of a
society,'2 then one might be tempted to see this, original arrangement as
sliding too far toward dependency, with the physician as "do-er" and the
patient as simply the one being "done to." Given this contextual frame, it is
no surprise that, as Szasz and Hollender contend, the major form of the
physician-patient relationship is "guidance-cooperation" with the physician as
the expert and the patient as the cooperative but deferential participant. 3 If
the role of bioethics is to oppose whatever basic dehumanizing tendencies
exist in the modern medical approach, then, as Professor Schneider contends,
autonomy is one of the central features of the bioethics discourse for good
reason.'4 Not surprisingly, the empowerment and the reassertion of the
patient as the individual decision-maker form crucial elements in discussions.
Conceived within the same social frame, bioethics recognizes the inherent
violations of individualism celebrated generally in modern society and
particularly in modern American society. At its core, the drive for profession-
alism contradicts the ideologies of individualism and equality that stand as the
hallmarks of modern, industrial democracies.
But, as the debate surrounding the rise of professions overemphasized the
virtues of the beneficent and neutral expert and swung the pendulum to the
extreme for the rights and duties of expert authorities, the bioethical paradigm
swings it to the other extreme, overblowing the desires and the need for
patient autonomy. As Professor Schneider argues based on his foray into
1O. See generally RAYMOND S. DUFF &AUGUSTB. HOLINGSHEAD, SICKNESS AND SOCIETY (1968).
11. PARSONS, supra note 7, at 428-79.
12. KAI T. ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH: DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY IN THE BUFFALO
CREEK FLOOD 82 (1976).
13. Thomas S. Szasz & Marc H. Hollender, The Basic Models of the Doctor-Patient Relationship,
in DOMINANT ISSUES IN MEDICAL SOCIOLOGY 174-76 (Howard 0. Schwartz ed., 1987).
14. Schneider, supra note 1, at 1086-90.
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grounded theory, systematic empirical research suggests that this basic tenet
of bioethics stands contrary to patients' desires to shoulder that individualistic
burden."5 Decisions are often too complicated, even for patients who
consider themselves highly educated or intelligent. Considering that a basic
aim of medical school is, according to Renre Fox, to "train for uncertainty"
(for example, physicians must come to identify routinely what they do not
know that is known, what is not yet known, and to demarcate the line between
the two), it is easy to comprehend this reaction from patients and their
families who rarely confront these life and death decisions. 6 It is similarly
easy to understand why patients would want a shoulder to lean on and a
professional trained to stand in a more knowledgeable and objective position
of strength.
In sum, bioethics and biomedicine were formed on the fault line defined by
the tension between the individual and modem society. The intellectual
struggle to deal with this tension, to this point, takes a view of patients and
practitioners as individual, rational actors weighing the costs and benefits of
action. I now turn to the use and wisdom of this view, consistent with modern
society.
II.
This intense focus on autonomy should both strike a familiar cord and send
a shiver up the spine. It recalls the fundamental tension between the
individual and society, whether one chooses to see society as a peacemaker
of separate, self-interested individuals or as an iron cage restricting individual
liberty and action. Notions of whether individuals are, should be, or want to
be autonomous decision-makers is the focus of a lively and sometimes heated
debate in the social sciences. This type of rational choice-based approach
dominates theory and policy discussion in areas like health care.'7 It is used
implicitly by most modem social theorists and by most people as part of a
common sense psychology invoked to understand what they and others do.'
Not suprisingly, from a sociology of knowledge perspective, this economic
psychology matches the worldview of most people living in modem, industrial
societies because it emphasizes three phenomena. These are: the ultimate
importance of agency (whatever structural constraints may exist); the conjoint
nature of modern society, autonomy, and rational thinking; and everyday
notions of the inescapable need to balance pros and cons.
15. Id. at 1090-92.
16. Ren~e C. Fox, Training for Uncertainty, in THE STUDENT PHYSICIAN 207 (Robert K. Merton
et al. eds., 1957).
17. See David Mechanic, The Role of Sociology in Health Affairs, in HEALTH AFFAIRS 85 (Spring
1990).
18. For a thorough and recent treatise on the rational choice approach in socio-science see JAMES
S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (1990).
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Yet, even those social scientists adopting the rational choice perspective
have had to reconsider basic conceptual elements.' 9 Work spanning the
spectrum from ethomethodology in sociology to institutional economics shows
that people do not generally act as autonomous individuals weighing the costs
and benefits of possible decisions. Even revised approaches strip individuals
from society by portraying them as alone, outside of the social interactions
that make them who they are. Almost without recognition, it removes the
dynamics of decision-making and plucks the decision from the discussions and
social context in which individuals create and maintain their lives.20 Despite
its focus on the family as the decision-making unit, the bioethical paradigm
falls into the same traps.
Discussion within the social sciences bears directly on the weakness of a
patient autonomy model. The autonomy paradigm rests on an assumption of
what people want and how they behave in decision-making circumstances.
Despite the interest of rational choice theorists to make simplifying assump-
tions about the nature of individuals and of bioethicists to subscribe to this
view to strengthen their arguments, a common bias exists. This bias reflects
how people in modem societies ought to act, at least according to intellectuals
who then must argue about how things should change.2' The social science
that Professor Schneider so stunningly organizes points clearly to two facts.
First, patients do not necessarily want autonomy. Second, patients involved
in decision-making for medical care acknowledge the larger structures in
which their lives are embedded. In their social networks, individuals recognize
or fail to recognize problems, find the limits of their social resources (their
own and their physician's), and find a way to evaluate the outcome of their
actions. Individuals are social and pragmatic, not isolated and ever-conscious-
ly rational. Individuals appear to want involvement in the social process of
decision-making for themselves and their families. This desire occurs under
the structural condition that individuals believe that physicians are experts but
are not infallible and are not necessarily aware of other, non-medical factors
that might be important in a particular case. Patients want information and the
option to have a voice in their own health care decisions. They also
understand the specialized knowledge and skill of physicians. Even when
national polls have documented skepticism and rising loss of confidence levels
concerning the medical profession in general, patients report very high levels
19. See, for example, the new "public choice" school in political science or "socio-economics" in
sociology. Elinor Ostrom, Microconstitutional Change in Multiconstitutional Political Systems, 1
RATIONALriY & Soc. 11 (1989).
20. For a summary of this debate and a suggestion for an alternative view relevant for medical
phenomena, see Bernice A. Pescosolido, Beyond Rational Choice: The Social Dynamics of How People
Seek Help, 97 AM. J. OF SOC. 1096 (1992).
21. The bias makes further assumptions about what physicians want and how they behave. For
physicians in clinical decision-making, consultations in professional networks are built into the routine
of daily life. "Hyperationalism," to use Professor Schneider's apt term, applies not only to how bioethics
stereotypes patients, but also to how it stereotypes practitioners.
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of satisfaction with their doctors.22 They have bought into the social contract
of professional dominance, perhaps to one degree or another, but bought into
the culture of expertise nonetheless. In essence, people want the tools of
medicine to be at the disposal of their values. They do not want autonomy;
they want self-determination. While some physicians may truly believe that
their job is to lay the information at the doorstep and wait for an answer, this
approach has the latent function of tapping into a desire on the part of a
medicine besieged by threats of malpractice, to avoid responsibility by
extending freedom.
In sum, patient autonomy in bioethics, the notion that decisions should be
made by the patient given all pertinent medical information, rings of naivete
regarding how patients and physicians enter the social process of decision-
making.23 This notion characterizes medical decision-making, both by the
profession and by the public, as a rational calculated process. Neither is
accurate. In the real world, people reject the paternalistic prescriptions of
bioethicists designed to counter the paternalistic prescriptions of physicians.
III.
Even if autonomy represented the realities of medical decision-making, the
question remains whether it would be a wise program for the future. In my
opinion, the central question is not, as Professor Schneider contends, whether
there are holes appearing in the fabric of the bioethical paradigm.24 The
bioethical paradigm represents one patch in an intricate social quilt, one that
reflects a contrasting theme in the overall design. The crucial questions
surround the strength of the larger social quilt, which may be worn, or its
connecting squares, whose fraying may weaken the power and relevance of
current thinking in bioethics. A focus on the unravelling of these parts of the
larger mosaic helps one to understand the problems in the bioethical
paradigm. In particular, two issues arise.
First, there may be holes in the biomedical paradigm patch, where even the
extraordinary promise of modern medicine is limited by things which cannot
be altered (like death), by chronic diseases that do not fit neatly in biomedical
understanding, and by technology, which (in the spirit of the Kuhnian
approach) has produced many of the problems that bioethics and biomedicine
now confront.25 Bioethics faces a "crisis" because the phenomena it seeks to
aid or to confront are in crisis. Second, the quilt's border, the paradigm of
modern society which orders the unique patches, may itself be threadbare.
22. See, e.g., JAMES A. DAVIS & TOM W. SMITH, GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY, 1972-1993:
CUMULATIVE CODEBOOK (National Opinion Research Center 1993).
23. For an extreme and conservative view, see IVAN ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS: THE EXPROPRIA-
TION OF HEALTH (1976).
24. Schneider, supra note 1, at 1077.
25. See, e.g., RICHARD A. McCoRMICK, HIDDEN PERSUADERS: VALUE VARIABLES IN BIOETHICS
5 (Poynter Center ed. 1993) (noting the reaction against paternalism and the flowering of patient
autonomy).
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This is not a pessimistic statement predicting doom or a yearning for days
gone by. It simply acknowledges the likely similarity between the transition
from agrarian society to industrial society and the current transition to some
newer form of social life. The transition at the turn of the last century
emphasized the conditions that made individualism and autonomy the essential
bases of the polity, the economy, and the medical sector. The current
transition, which social scientists are struggling to describe and understand,
may grant autonomy to such a degree that the countervailing call in medicine,
in social institutions in general, and in bioethics in particular, may be for
more integration and for community-based decision-making. Autonomy may
become yesterday's issue as it is replaced by the need for social connections
so strained by the complexities and pace of contemporary society.
Modern medicine confronts a complicated situation: a loss of confidence by
the public, a loss of key control in the content of medical work in the face of
utilization review, and a loss of theoretical power in the face of chronic
illness-in general, an erosion of professional autonomy. Medicine cannot
sustain the "guidance-cooperation" model under these conditions. Rather, it
has been forced to move in many situations toward Szasz and Hollender's
model of "mutual participation" in which physicians and patients together
chart the course of care.2" Neither the paternalism of professional dominance
nor the paternalism of patient autonomy are viable in the face of current
circumstances. These simplistic views have rhetorical utility for intellectual
debate; they are less helpful in improving the situation of physicians and
patients as they confront serious health and illness issues now or in the future.
We need to reject the view of clinical and medical decision-making as
atomistic, rational-choice processes. Instead, we should consider physician and
patients to be partners in a dynamic, interactive process of decision-making
fundamentally intertwined with the structural rhythms of social life. A
bioethical view that links individuals to each other, to their community, and
to the larger social system offers a more complicated but realistic and useful
foundation to set the terms of the debate. Rather than simplifying the task or
diminishing the importance of bioethics, this view presents a challenge. It is
easier to build an ideo-typical form of medical decision-making when one
starts with individuals (whether patient or physician) as puppets of some
abstract contract or as calculating individualists. Seeing them shape and
shaped by society, using cognition and emotion to live their lives, makes the
task more difficult. It is true, as Professor Schneider argues, that no viable
alternatives have been extensively or persuasively developed to this point."
But as the early paradigms of modern, industrial society and modern scientific
medicine fall by the wayside, the crucial conditions open for the production
of new knowledge, for rethinking, and for innovation. Bioethics stands,
hopefully, on the threshold of scientific revolution.
26. Szasz & Hollender, supra note 13, at 176.
27. Schneider, supra note 1.
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